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INDIVIDUALIZED SCHOOL SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: WHAT'S A SCHOOL DISTRICT TO DO?*
As high-profile incidents of school violence appear to become more frequent
and severe, public perception has deteriorated to the point where many citizens
believe that schools are unsafe and administrators lack the power to control student
activity. In their efforts to promote a safe learning environment, many school
administrators have attempted to create strict guidelines concerning the power of
school personnel to prevent illegal and unsafe activity from taking place at school.
However, as administrators devise the rules by which to implement these standards,
they are given little guidance by the Supreme Court regarding the application ofthe
Fourth Amendment to a school setting. This Note examines the Court's reluctance
to provide a clear directive to school districts as to the proper limits of students'
Fourth Amendment protections while at school. The author examines the limited
precedent of the Supreme Court, as well as the reasoning put forth by various state
courts, to reveal the wide range offactors relied upon to differing degrees by courts
in determining the constitutionality ofa school search. The Note calls for the Court
to clarify the constitutional boundaries of school searches and provide
administrators with an adequate standard on which to base school policies.
INTRODUCTION
Now more than any time in recent history, both educational administrators and
parents of schoolchildren are concerned greatly about the safety of students in
public schools at all levels of K-12 education.' Indeed, the recent school shootings
at high schools in Santee, California and El Cajon, California, in March of 2001,
have once again heightened these grave concerns.2 As statistics differ on the
proximity between the perceptions of danger in American schools and the relatively
safe reality,' school boards and administrators concomitantly fear the legal
* J.D. candidate, College of William & Mary School of Law, 2002; B.A., Washburn
University, 1999. The author would like to thank his family for their endless encouragement
and support, and Professor Paul Marcus for his invaluable assistance in selecting this topic
and for reviewing earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are mine.
' See Carey Goldberg & Marjorie Connelly, Fear and Violence Have Declined Among
Teenagers, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999, at A1; Diane Plumberg, School Safety
Upgrades Urged, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 28, 2000, at NEWS.
2 Jamie Reno & Suzanne Smalley, Using Students as Metal Detectors, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 19, 2001, at 28 (describing the shooting at Santana High School in Santee, California);
James Sterngold, Police Say Student Gunman Was Seeking School Official, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2001, at A8 (providing details on the Granite Hills High School shooting in El
Cajon, California).
' Compare Juvenile Crime, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 1998, at 24 (the
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ramifications of overzealous preventative tactics in response to the "perceived"
threat, particularly in the area of search and seizure. In theory, the concerns for
student safety and prevention of litigation might make for a workable
counterbalance in which a prototypical school district could function rationally,
inevitably settling on the individual search policy that works best for that school or
district.
In practice, however, many school districts are left out on a limb to develop
their own guidelines due to the Supreme Court's continued lack of specific
guidance in this area of the law. To date, the Court has rendered only two decisions
concerning the Fourth Amendment's application in the school search setting: New
number of juveniles arrested for violent crimes as defined by the FBI's Uniform Crime
Reporting Program (UCR) decreased for two consecutive years in 1995 and 1996), andU.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIMES AND SAFETY V
(1999) (reporting that "young people are less likely to be victimized at school than when
they are away from school" and that the overall victimization rate actually has declined
between 1993 and 1997 for some types of school-based crime), and W. David Watkins &
John S. Hooks, The Legal Aspects of School Violence: Balancing School Safety with
Students 'Rights, 69 Miss. L.J. 641,643-46 (1999) (arguing in part that "America's schools
are generally safe"), with William Celis III, Schools Getting Tough on Guns in the
Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at AI (stating that in 1994, the National School
Boards Association estimated that approximately 135,000 guns were brought to the nation's
85,000 public schools on any given day).
4 See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 1999 WL 43249 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(holding a discharge action in which a physical education teacher was terminated for
initiating individual semi-strip searches of students in her gym class after one student
reported that $91 was missing from her backpack was wrongful); Regina Apigo, Surprise
Visit by Sniffers at 6 Schools Nets 1 Knife, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Feb.
5, 2000, at B03 ("District officials said they hoped the drug-sniffing dog program would
deter students from bringing drugs or weapons to school"; "[o]ne student refused to have her
backpack sniffed because, she said, it violated her civil rights. She was suspended for three
days."); Rhea R. Borja, Henrico Teacher May Lose Job; Spoke to Students, ACLUAbout
Random Search, THE RICHMONDTIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 2000, atAl (reporting that after
a random search of students in her high school science class by school administrators, a
teacher talked to her students in class about the search, sought advice from the ACLU, and
then wrote a letter to the principal suggesting guidelines for random searches; the teacher
was fired by school administrators for her efforts. An assistant principal at the high school,
who was also one of the officials that conducted the search, said, "I was shocked by [the
letter's] tone. Random searches are a deterrent.... I felt the accusations make our team look
bad."); Andrew Goldsmith, First Districtwide Handbook Spells OutRules for Students, THE
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 26, 2000, at 2C (reporting that according to the
school district's new handbook, "[n]o right or expectation of privacy exists for any student
as to the use of any locker issued or assigned to a student by the school.., lockers may be
searched at any time without prior notice").
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Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 47Jv. Acton.5 The latter case held
that a random drug testing policy for students engaged in an extracurricular activity
did not violate the Fourth Amendment;6 the former case will be analyzed in detail
infra. While one court has construed this pair of cases to establish a dichotomy of
analysis between school searches of individuals, as in T.L.O., and more random,
broad "sweeps" akin to a DUI roadblock,7 this note will focus primarily on the
individually-oriented issues on which the T.L. 0. Court did not rule.
Some states have attempted to fill the jurisprudential void not within the
judicial branch, but via executive action from the governor, the state department of
education, or select statewide task forces.8 Other states have attempted to tackle the
problem through the legislative process.9 However, solutions such as broad
recommended guidelines, although well-meaning, suffer from the same critical
problem as the current lack of judicial clarity regarding school searches: their
generality and "one size fits all" approach to the Fourth Amendment rights of
students fails to give each school district adequate direction, particularly in light of
several commonplace fact scenarios on which lower courts currently disagree.
Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, "school security, like security for other
applications, is not simple and straightforward."'0 "No two schools will have
identical and successful security programs - hence, a security solution for one
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985).
6 Acton, 515 U.S. at 646.
7 See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied Cass v.
Pennsylvania, 525 U.S. 833 (1998).
' Ronald Susswein, The New Jersey School Search Policy Manual: Striking the
Balance of Students'Rights of Privacy and Security After the Columbine Tragedy, 34 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 527 (2000); see also Diane Plumberg, School Safety Upgrades Urged, THE
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 28, 2000, at NEWS (describing the results of Oklahoma's Task
Force on School Violence, which included supporting "unannounced drug and weapon
searches" and "creat[ing] a climate of respect").
' See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (West 1993) (prohibiting strip searches); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 808A.2 (4a) (West 1994 and Supp. 1999) (prohibiting strip searches); 70
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 24-102 (West 1998) ("Pupils shall not have any reasonable expectation
of privacy towards school administrators or teachers in the contents of a school locker, desk,
or other school property[,]" and schools shall inform pupils of the same in their student
discipline code.); S.C. CODE ANN., § 59-63-1150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) ("All school
administrators must receive training in the 'reasonableness standard' under existing case law
to Mary W. Green, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in US.
Schools: A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies, in NAT'L INST. OF JUST.
RESEARCH REPORT NCJ 178265, Sept. 1999, at v.
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school cannot just be replicated at other schools with complete success."" The
Supreme Court has further complicated the situation by consistently denying
certiorari to subsequent cases that could clarify the Court's stance on this
increasingly troublesome, and frequently complex, quandary. 2 This Note will
argue that the Supreme Court should examine any of several factual scenarios that
school districts regularly confront and establish per se rules or, at the very least,
articulate more specific factors to consider before undertaking individual searches
within public schools.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause.... .""3 These protections are implicated against the states, and thus
their educational institutions, via the Fourteenth Amendment and do not attach to
the acts of private actors. 4 This general protection afforded to students in the
school setting gave rise to an intriguing constitutional dilemma: how to adequately
balance the individual student's interest to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures (or, more generally stated, the personal privacy interest) with the state's
interest in maintaining a safe learning environment for all students. In 1985, the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve this dilemma in the landmark case of New
Jersey v. T.L. 0., " a case that has now become "established" as a key principle in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 16
A. T.L.O. Facts
In TL.O., a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, New
Jersey, discovered two girls smoking in a bathroom, one of whom was respondent
11 Id.
'2 See, e.g., Cass, 709 A.2d at 350; Jenkins v. Talladega Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821
(1 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966 (1997); Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist.,
55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 995 (1995); Isiah B. v. Wisconsin, 500
N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884 (1993); United States v. Attson, 900
F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Attson v. United States, 498 U.S. 961 (1990).
'" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies the Fourth Amendment to the states).
15 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
16 Greenleaf v. Cote, 2000 WL 863217, at 3 (D. Me. 2000).
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T.L.O., a high school freshman. 7 The teacher escorted the two girls to the vice
principal's office, where they were questioned about the incident.' T.L.O.'s
companion admitted that she had violated the school's rule against smoking on
school grounds, but T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking and claimed that she
did not smoke at all.' 9 The vice principal asked T.L.O. to come into his office and
demanded to see her purse, in which he found a pack of cigarettes; as he reached
into the purse for the cigarettes, he also saw a pack of cigarette rolling papers.20 In
the vice principal's experience, rolling papers possessed by high school students
were "closely associated" with marijuana use, so the vice principal then thoroughly
searched the purse.2 ' That "search revealed a small amount of marihuana, a pipe,
a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills,
an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and
two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing."22 The vice principal
notified the girl's mother and the police and turned over the evidence of drug
dealing obtained from the search of the purse to the police.23 At police request,
T.L.O.'s mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where she ultimately
confessed to selling drugs at Piscataway High School.24
Based on the confession and the vice principal's search, the state charged
T.L.O. with delinquency injuvenile court, where T.L.O. moved to suppress both the
contents of the purse search, which she claimed violated the Fourth Amendment,
and the confession, which she contended was tainted by the search. The juvenile
court denied her motion, and she appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which
reversed the decision.26 The court concluded that, although a warrantless search by
a school official passes Fourth Amendment scrutiny so long as the official "has
reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity
or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order[,]" the vice
principal's search of the purse did not meet that reasonableness requirement.2' The
Supreme Court granted New Jersey's subsequent petition for certiorari.28
" T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 329.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330-31.
28 State in Interest of T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983), cert. granted, New Jersey v.
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Writing for the majority, Justice White first concluded that the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment do apply to public school officials as representatives of the
State, not solely as surrogates for individual parents, when conducting searches of
students.29 The Court, however, in striking "the balance between the schoolchild's
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to
maintain an environment in which learning can take place" held that a less stringent
test applies to evaluate these types of searches than is used to review searches by
law enforcement officers.3" Specifically, a search's legality in the school setting
depends "simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search."' Evaluating reasonableness involves a two-part inquiry: the search must
be "justified at its inception," and it must be "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place[.]" 32 Interestingly,
the language forming this test was quoted directly from Terry v. Ohio, the landmark
"stop and frisk" case.33 The Court's stated goal in proceeding down this path was
to "spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves
in the niceties of probable cause" and proceed on a more common-sense approach
while ensuring that students' interests "will be invaded no more than is necessary
to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools." '34  "
As to the search of T.L.O., the incident in question actually involved two
searches, the first being for cigarettes and the second for marijuana.35 According
to the Court, the teacher's account of finding the two girls smoking cigarettes in the
bathroom gave rise to reasonable suspicion for the vice principal to search T.L.O.'s
purse for cigarettes. 6 The Court was not persuaded by the fact that discovery of the
cigarettes would not have proven conclusively that T.L.O. was in fact smoking, but
instead found that this type of search would be justified despite the fact that the
evidence, "if found, would constitute 'mere evidence' of a violation."37 During the
course of the search, the vice principal discovered cigarettes as well as rolling
papers, and the latter created sufficient reasonable suspicion for the more broad
search of the purse for marijuana or evidence related to it.38 The continued
T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
29 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333-34, 336-37.
30 Id. at 340.
31 Id. at 341.
32 Id.
13 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
34 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
31 Id. at 343-44.
36 Id. at 345.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 346.
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examination of the purse's contents once the marijuana was discovered, the Court
reasoned, was also constitutionally permissible to gather further evidence of illegal
or otherwise prohibited activity, such as the list of people who owed T.L.O.
money." Thus, the Court concluded that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was
reasonable in all respects.40
B. Open Issues
Despite its facially-broad applicability, the Court in T.L. 0. expressly declined
to rule or provide guidance on a number of issues related to the reasonableness test.
First, the Court specifically refused to consider whether the exclusionary rule is the
appropriate remedy for a search conducted by school officials.4 ' The focus of this
Note is more concerned with impacts on school districts, however, so this open
question will not be addressed.4" Second, the Court Similarly avoided deciding "the
appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school
officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies[.] 42
With the proliferation of police officers, private security, and other "resource
officers" in public schools in recent years, the regular interaction between school
officials and law enforcement (actual, defacto, or otherwise) has increased greatly,
thus creating a larger constitutional dilemma for schools than the Court likely
anticipated in 1985. Third, no decision was rendered as to whether students have
reasonable expectations "of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property
provided for the storage of school supplies." '3 Some school districts attempt to
dodge this concern by affirmatively declaring in their student handbooks that no
privacy rights exist in lockers and that lockers may be searched at any time without
notice." While certainly innovative, it remains unclear whether providing students
19 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346.
41 Id. at 347.
4' Id. at 333 n.3. Compare id., with Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding in part that exclusionary rule did not apply to high school student's §
1983 wrongful expulsion action).
42 For a discussion of the exclusionary rule's applicability to searches conducted by
school officials, see generally D. Shane Jones, Application Of The "Exclusionary Rule" To
Bar Use Of Illegally Seized Evidence In Civil School Disciplinary Proceedings, 52 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 375 (1997); Mai Linh Spencer, Note, Suppress Or Suspend: New
York's Exclusionary Rule In School Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1494
(1997).
42 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.
41 Id. at 337 n.5.
4 See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 24-102 (West 1998) ("Pupils shall not have any
reasonable expectation of privacy towards school administrators or teachers in the contents
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with notice of this type is enough to make reasonable what otherwise might be
considered unreasonable. Fourth, as the search of T.L.O. was based on
individualized suspicion that she had been smoking, the Court did not have occasion
to "decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
reasonableness standard" it adopted for these types of searches.45 However, the
increased prevalence of "sweeps" through classrooms or schools as a deterrent to
disruptive or unlawful activity in public schools has created numerous constitutional
concerns.
46
The Supreme Court recently attempted to address some of these concerns in
Vernonia School District 47Jv. Acton."7 At issue in the case was a school district
policy of performing random urinalysis drug tests on students who participated in
the schools' athletic programs, motivated by the discovery that athletes were
"leaders of the drug culture" and the concern for increased risk of sports-related
injury as a result of drug use.48 The Court found that, unlike TL.O., this type of
search was not based on individual suspicion of wrongdoing, even though the
Fourth Amendment carries "no irreducible requirement of such suspicion[.]' ' 9
Characterizing the search policy as both a school search and a categorical drug test,
the Court balanced three factors in declaring the district's policy constitutional: the
individual expectation of privacy, the character of the intrusion, and the
governmental interest in conducting the search.5" Whereas Acton attempted to
answer several interesting questions (and raises others) regarding the application of
the Fourth Amendment in schools, this Note will explore those areas of the
quandary more closely related to searches of individuals that the Court has not
addressed at all, instead of concentrating on concerns that the Court has recently
attempted to clarify.
Not only did the T.L. 0. Court expressly pass on the four topics discussed supra,
but it also left open (and continues to ignore) another situation that regularly
frustrates school districts and their administrators. The potential legality of
searching students' cars that are parked on school grounds presents equivalent, if
not greater, constitutional headaches. Indeed, state courts currently are split on the
issue of whether a comparable privacy interest arises in cars as compared to a
of a school locker, desk, or other school property[,]" and schools shall inform pupils of the
same in their student discipline code.); Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2C.
41 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
46 See generally Borja, supra note 4.
41 515 U.S. 646(1995).
41 Id. at 649.
49 Id. at 653.
SO Id. at 664-65.
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student's person, her backpack, or her locker.5 Additionally, courts seem quite
uncertain as to whether the relevant inquiry in these types of cases concerns where
the search occurs (on or off campus) or who conducts the search (i.e. school
officials, campus police, or outside officers).
In total, this Note will examine three separate factual scenarios that school
districts regularly encounter and about which they are increasingly concerned. The
Court should examine these problems in an effort to provide guidance to school
districts and law enforcement in this troublesome area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. This Note will explore the following areas: individual searches of
lockers (as distinguished from school-wide "sweeps", discussed supra); car
searches on school grounds; and the use of "resource officers" or other law
enforcement agents in conducting these searches.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Locker Searches
Other than items that are carried on a student's person, such as backpacks,
perhaps the area on which students most rely for storage of their personal items is
their lockers. Additionally, locker areas are places where students frequently
socialize between classes and broaden their educational experience by intei'acting
with others, in a non-academic setting. Unfortunately, all too often students use
their lockers in furtherance of activities that run afoul of state laws or school rules.52
One natural question involves whether students have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the lockers that the school allocates to them. Furthermore, if such a
privacy interest in fact exists, one must also consider whether it arises to the same
extent as the privacy right in one's person and the effects within his or her
immediate control. Finally, would the same quantum of proof discussed in TL.O.
be required in order to initiate an individual locker search, or is the privacy interest
sufficiently less as to authorize a lesser level of suspicion? Sadly, the Supreme
Court has expressly declined to review these questions within the context of the
SI See infra notes 98-175 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985) (a student was suspected
of having an alcoholic beverage in his locker, and a warrantless search of the locker revealed
a substantial amount of marijuana).
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Fourth Amendment,53 and a great deal of confusion and uncertainty has resulted in
effectively administering the Fourth Amendment's tenets in public schools.
1. Existence or Nonexistence of the Privacy Interest
The decision as to whether a student's privacy rights extend to her locker can
enter the T.L.O. two-part analysis at either stage. For example, a question could
arise as to whether a search was "justified at its inception" when a school official
searched only the locker, or when the official started his inquiry at that point."'
Similarly, if an individual student search started with the student's person and
effects and then proceeded to her locker, one could examine whether the official's
search as a whole was "reasonably related in scope" to finding the contraband
sought.55 Nevertheless, in either event, the threshold question arises as to the
student's underlying privacy interest in an area in which she may frequently store
personal items.56 To date, state and federal courts have yet to arrive at a workable
consensus on this issue.
For a variety of reasons, some states have concluded that students possess
legitimate expectations of privacy in their lockers. In S. C. v. State,57 the Mississippi
Supreme Court reached this conclusion, albeit on state constitutional grounds, from
the language of T.L.O. that described its version of "high school 'reality[;]"' it
found that "there is no reason to conclude that [students] have necessarily waived
all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds." 8
However, the S.C. court went on to limit that right due to the conclusion that a
"student's expectation of privacy in a school locker is considerably less than he
would have in the privacy of his home or even, perhaps, his automobile."59
Mississippi's jurisprudence remains unclear as to the extent it limits this privacy
interest in S.C., because the court primarily based its finding of reasonableness on
" See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985).
s4 Id. at 341.
S5 Id.
56 Id. The T.L.O. court lumped desks and lockers together along with other "school
property provided for the storage of school supplies." Id. at 337 n.5. Curiously, when
examining the student's privacy interest generally, the Court noted that students may
legitimately carry personal effects and items, in addition to those items necessary for
classroom study, and retain their privacy interest as to those items. Id. at 339. The TL.O.
court declined, however, to complete the next inferential step and delineate in which types
of places students retain privacy interests for those personal effects. Id.
s 583 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1991).
Id. at 191 (quoting T.L.O., at 339).
59 Id. at 192.
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an exigency suggested by the potential presence of a gun in the defendant's locker.'
Pennsylvania's courts also have elicited the view that students possess some
privacy interest in their lockers. In Dumas v. Commonwealth,6 the court relied
upon the same T.L.O. language as did the court in S.C., and the Dumas court's
conclusory language is rather striking in its common-sense approach:
These are the types of items which students store in lockers and for which
lockers are provided. We are unable to conclude that a student would have
an expectation of privacy in a purse or jacket which the student takes to
school but would lose that expectation of privacy merely by placing the
purse or jacket in school locker provided to the student for storage of
personal items.62
In so concluding, the court analogized the situation to the privacy expectation
an employee would have in a locker located at his or her workplace.63 However, the
court did not grant an absolute right to students; rather, like the privacy right that
attaches to one's person and items within one's immediate control, the locker
privacy right is not "absolute" and must still be balanced in the T.L.O. analysis
against "the school's need to maintain order and discipline." In a concurring
opinion, however, two judges did not reach this conclusion absolutely. They chose
not to join the majority because the "record does not indicate that the school made
any special restrictions with regard to the nature of the items which could be stored
in the locker," nor did they "notify students that use of the lockers would be subject
to random or periodic inspection or search" or "follow a uniform policy or
consistent practice regarding locker searches."65 As a result, the students' privacy
right remained "unrestricted" in terms of reasonableness." The opinion went out
of its way to note, however, that because of the fact that drugs and violence "have
found a foothold in our schools and threaten the vital educational process," students
may store personal items in their lockers "by license and not by right." The
concurring judges found that a student possesses "no constitutional entitlement to
a private school locker'"? Of great importance to the concurring judges in Dumas
was the presence or absence of notice to the students:
60 Id.
6 515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
62 Id. at 985.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 986.
65 Id. at 986 (Kelly, J., concurring).
66 Dumas, 515 A.2d at 987 (Kelly, J., concurring).
67 Id.
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[I]n order for a school to make the transition from a practice of allowing
students to maintain the privacy in their lockers to a practice of regular or
periodic inspection or search, ample notice must be given of any such
limitations. The importance of notice to the students of any change in the
policy regarding the privacy of school lockers cannot be overstated.
Because no such notice was given in the instant case, the search was
unconstitutional and the evidence must be suppressed.68
Recently the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania generally reaffirmed the
conclusion the majority reached in Dumas while taking a similar approach to
school-wide locker searches,69 analogizing them more to traffic roadblocks under
a state constitutional theory.7" Additionally, Massachusetts latched onto the court's
analysis in Dumas, among other cases, in reaching a similar conclusion on both
federal and state constitutional grounds.7 Interestingly, the facts in the Snyder case
offered a rebuttal for the concurrence in Dumas because the "school administration
explicitly acknowledged in the students' rights and responsibility code that each
student had the right '[n]ot to have his/her locker subjected to unreasonable
search."'72 Maryland and Illinois have also joined many states in utilizing a
common-sense approach to extending a student's reasonable expectation of privacy
to the locker.73
However, not all courts have concurred in this analysis. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin encountered this very question in Isiah B. v. State,74 a case that raised
many of the arguments against recognizing a student's privacy interest in her locker.
Madison High School incurred a series of gun-involved complaints during the fall
of 1990 that peaked on one November weekend. On Friday night, students reported
that they were fired at when leaving the school basketball game, and when a riot
nearly erupted at a school dance on Saturday night, gunshots were exchanged.7" In
6I Id. at 988 (Kelly, J., concurring).
69 Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 359 n.8 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, Cass v.
Pennsylvania, 525 U.S. 833 (1998).
70 Cass, 709 A.2d at 361.
71 See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass. 1992) (citing State ex
rel. T.L.O. v. Engerud, 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983)); State v. Michael G., 748 P.2d 17 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1987); Dumas v. Commonwealth, 515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); State V.
Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
72 Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1366.
13 See, e.g., In re Patrick Y., 723 A.2d 523, 528 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); People v.
Taylor, 625 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1993).
74 500 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993).
71 Id. at 638.
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response to an "atmosphere of tension and fear" that "dominated" the school the
following Monday, the principal directed school security personnel to begin a
"random" search of lockers "as a preventative measure while he continued
investigatory interviews."76 Part of the principal's authorization for this measure
came from the Milwaukee Public School Handbook, which indicated that lockers
were the property of the school and subject to inspection or search as the school
deems appropriate or necessary." The security guard inspected between seventy-
five and one hundred lockers before coming upon Isiah B.'s locker.78 The school
had no individualized suspicion regarding Isiah, nor did he have any prior history
of weapons violations or any activity that might potentially link him to the threat of
violence at the school that day.79 Upon opening Isiah's locker, the officer found a
coat, removed it, and found it to be unusually heavy." He then patted down the
coat's exterior and felt what he believed to be a gun, at which point he notified the
principal."' A further search of the coat revealed not only the suspected gun, but
also an undisclosed amount of cocaine.82 Subsequently, the state filed a
delinquency petition against Isiah B. alleging one firearms count and one drug
distribution count.83 Isiah moved to suppress the gun and cocaine as fruits of an
illegal search under the Fourth Amendment, and the circuit court denied the
motion."
At oral argument, the State of Wisconsin argued that students have no
reasonable expectations of privacy in their lockers, and thus, no search took place
for Fourth Amendment purposes.85 The majority of the court accepted the State's
argument, albeit on somewhat questionable terms. It ruled that because the
76 Id.
17 Id. at 639. The full text of the policy is as follows:
School lockers are the property of Milwaukee Public Schools. At no time does the
Milwaukee school district relinquish its exclusive control of lockers provided for
the convenience of students. Periodic general inspections of lockers may be
conducted by school authorities for any reason at any time, without notice, without
student consent, and without a search warrant.
Id. at 639 n. 1 (quoting a Milwaukee Public School Handbook).
78 Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 639.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 639.
84 Id.
8 Id. at 641.
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Milwaukee school system had a written policy distributed to students that gave them
notice of the school's retention of "ownership and possessory control of school
lockers," Milwaukee's students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
lockers, making the circuit court's ruling proper. 6 Further, "[i]f school authorities
do not have a locker policy like the one in this case, students might have a lowered
reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers."" Thus, the Wisconsin court
seems to have hinged the existence of a student's Fourth Amendment right on the
existence or nonexistence of adequate notice in the form of regulations promulgated
in a student handbook that few students are likely to read, let alone take seriously.
Unfortunately, the record in Isiah B. clearly indicates that the majority was
persuaded not by Fourth Amendment dictates but by the perceived "presence of
dangerous weapons in schools [a]s a recent and extremely serious problem.""8
However, not all of the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices followed that logic.
Justice Abrahamson concurred in part (arguing that the case should be remanded to
determine whether the imminent threat of violence that day posed exigent
circumstances that justified a random search of lockers as carried out here) and
dissented in part. 9 Her dissent focused primarily on the majority's anti-locker
privacy conclusion. In addition to relying in part on the quoted language from the
Dumas case," cited supra, her main argument was that, while providing notice to
students that a locker may be searched could potentially diminish the expectation
of privacy there, the government (or a school as a state actor) cannot simply
eradicate Fourth Amendment rights by proclaiming that it intends to do so or by
giving advance warning of the upcoming infringements on personal liberty."
Finally, Justice Abrahamson vehemently denounced the majority's use of the
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 642 (citing 1993 statistics indicating that "37% of male,
Wisconsin high school students carry weapons... 35% of the weapons... carried were
guns, 49% knives or razors, [and] 16% clubs, bats[,] ... pipes or other weapons").
89 Id. at 642 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
90 Id.
9 Id. at 645 (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The
government could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the
public that all telephone lines would be tapped, or that all homes would be searched.");
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 701 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (W.D. Ky. 1988) ("[M]ere knowledge that one
may be subject to search does not render one without any reasonable expectation of
privacy[.]"); Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
("[M]ere announcement by officials that individual rights are about to be infringed upon
cannot justify the subsequent infringement[.]"); Chenkin v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., 479 F.
Supp. 207, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff's expectation of privacy in his bag was not
rendered unreasonable by his employer's announced policy of searching employees' bags)).
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perceived danger in schools as a flimsy excuse by which to modify constitutional
standards.92 She further reminded the court of such cases as Hirabayashi v. United
States93 and Korematsu v. United States94 as lessons "in what can happen if we do
not abide by our constitutional principles when adapting the [C]onstitution to
",95crises.
2. Is Notice Enough? Enough For What?
Milwaukee's approach to tackling the thorny subject of privacy interests in
lockers is not a novel one.96 Perhaps this prevailing strategy at the school district
level is adopted to accomplish two things. First, it will act as a significant deterrent
to students who wish to bring contraband on campus; this is likely a school district's
chief objective. Second, should contraband be found in a student's locker and his
parents wish to challenge the search, a school need only point to the section in the
student handbook detailing its locker search policy. The existence of the policy
would likely discourage many parents from pressing the issue with legal counsel.
While the goals of school districts in implementing such locker policies are
certainly noble, they should avoid relying completely on those policies to justify
any locker search. This is because many states properly recognize that a locker
search remains subject to T.L.O.'s two-part reasonableness inquiry, regardless of
how a school district may have tried to allocate or deny privacy interests to
students.9" Thus, a blanket statement by a school indicating that lockers may be
searched at any time without notice or consent may end up being counter-productive
from a school's perspective because, while such a policy may discourage some
litigation by parents of aggrieved students, it also may invite school personnel to
unduly rely on the policy as controlling rather than T.L. 0., creating additional
potential Fourth Amendment violations in the process.
92 Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 645.
9 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfews for persons ofJapanese ancestry during World
War I1).
94 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affuming Hirabayashi and upholding relocation of Japanese
citizens to camps).
"I Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 645. Justice Abrahamson also adopted Justice Scalia's view
of the Constitution as a document that "is meant to protect against, rather than conform to,
current 'widespread belief."' Id. at 646 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,861 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
96 See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 24-102 (West 1998); Goldsmith, supra note 4.
17 For an analysis of cases upholding the proposition that a state may not abrogate a
constitutional protection by merely providing notice of that abrogation, see supra note 91
and accompanying text.
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B. Car Searches
Another area in which students' privacy rights clash squarely with the state's
educational interest in providing a safe and disciplined learning environment
involves warrantless searches of students' cars that are located on school grounds.
As noted supra, some states had considerable difficulty in finding that a student has
a privacy right within a school-provided locker.98 The privacy interest in one's car,
then, could be considered one step removed from a locker because students have far
less access to their cars than to their lockers during the school day. Also, cars
generally receive less Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches
than other items within one's immediate control, due in part to their mobility."
Finally, the Court in T.L.O. specifically found that warrants are particularly
unsuited to the school environment for searches undertaken by school officials.'°0
However, T.L. 0. also recognized that students may "find it necessary to carry
with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to
conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items
merely by bringing them onto school grounds."'' Indeed, one might contend that
a student's car fits into a similar classification as his or her locker because both are
used for storage to some degree and are located on school grounds. A car could
also be considered as more personal to a student than a school-supplied locker, thus
deserving greater protection. It might also be more "necessary" in terms of storage,
particularly at the high school level; while students are not required to use their
lockers to store their items, for many older students the use of their cars is the only
feasible way to get to and from school and still meet all of their outside obligations,
including after-school jobs or participation in extra-curricular activities. Thus, in
a given situation a particular student might in fact have a greater expectation of
privacy in something to which access is limited during the school day.
State courts have struggled since TL.O. to define both the scope and level of
students' privacy rights, as car searches in this context have presented unique policy
problems such as these. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's "reasonableness under
all the circumstances" standard tells school districts little about the proper
constitutional approach for car searches on school grounds.
1. Existence or Non-Existence of the Privacy Right
98 See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
9' See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153-54, 155-56 (1925).
1oo New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
10' Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
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One threshold question that state courts frequently encounter, although it rarely
presents itself squarely, is whether students in fact have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a car parked on school grounds. Mississippi recently confronted this
issue in Covington County v. G. W. 0 2 In G. W., a student informed teacher Candy
Knight that G.W., a seventeen-year-old minor, was drinking beer in the school
parking lot."3 Knight sent a note to Assistant Principal Richard Thames during
school hours advising him of this; the note was then delivered to Principal Billy Ray
Smith.0 4 Smith and a school security officer went to the parking lot and discovered
empty beer cans in the back of G.W.'s truck." 5 They asked G.W. to unlock his
vehicle and allow them to search it, and G.W. complied.'" The search revealed
seven unopened beer bottles that were located in a locked toolbox.0 7 Principal
Smith questioned G.W., and the student admitted that the beer was his and that he
had purchased it within the county; however, G.W. did not appear to be under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the search.'08 G.W. was suspended for five days,
but the Chancery Court in Covington County found that the school did not provide
G.W. proper notice as outlined in the school handbook and ordered that G.W. be
placed back in school.' ° The school district appealed." 0
In its unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held, inter alia, that
the search of G.W.'s vehicle was reasonable and proper under the Fourth
Amendment."' In so finding, the court noted that based on the information from
a student :and the presence of empty beer cans in G.W.'s truck, "[a]t the very
minimum, reasonable suspicion was established."' 2 G.W. claimed that the school
should have secured a warrant before searching his car, but the court dismissed that
argument for two reasons. First, it relied squarely on the language in T.L.O. that
warrants are unsuited to the school environment when school officials conduct
searches. Second, it placed a significant amount of reliance on the fact that "all
students who bring a vehicle onto school premises must register the vehicle. G.W.'s
registration form was signed by his mother and specifically states that 'vehicles will
02 767 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 2000).
'03 Id. at 188.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 G. W., 767 So. 2d at 188.
log Id.
109 Id.
"10 Id.
.. Id. at 194.
"' G. W., 767 So. 2d at 193.
113 Id.
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be routinely checked/searched.""' 4 Thus, this court seems to have applied some
fashion of the questionable notice analysis regarding school lockers, detailed in
Section 2A, supra,' 15 to a student's car.
G.W. also contended that he had a greater expectation of privacy in his car than
in his locker." 6 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected this argument as well,
concluding that, "[w]hile this may be true when one is driving down the street, we
can hardly say such a higher expectation of privacy should be had in a car on school
property as opposed to a school locker.' " In so concluding, however, the court
relied on a pre-TL. O. case in emphasizing the "'realities of the school setting,"' the
high value society places on education, and the need for an "'orderly atmosphere
which is free from danger and disruption.""'" Curiously, this court nine years
earlier in S.C. v. State had hinted that a student's privacy rights might be greater in
his car than in his locker." 9 However, both S. . and G. W were greatly concerned
with the potential presence of drugs and other contraband in its schools, and both
cases upheld the searches in question, thus from a policy standpoint the two can be
resolved in that manner. 20 Nevertheless, while Mississippi does not recognize a
"higher" privacy interest in one's car,'2' the G. W court implicitly must have found
some interest, or else the principal would not have even needed reasonable
suspicion to conduct the search. This interest, though, is not greater than the rather
limited interest a student has in his or her locker.'
Other states have encountered similar questions and arrived at comparable
conclusions. In FS.E. v. State,' a high school assistant principal smelled
114 Id.
... See generally supra notes 52-97 and accompanying text.
116 G. W., 767 So. 2d at 193.
117 Id.
"I Id. at 193-94 (citing State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
"9 583 So. 2d 188, 191 (Miss. 1991).
'20 A significant number of state courts, like the court in G. W., seem to spend more time
focused on the intolerable presence of drugs and weapons in their states' schools than on the
particular rights and responsibilities of the parties. See, e.g., G. W, 767 So. 2d at 193-94.
Courts have been cautioned, however, both to refrain from using a judicial dispute as a
vehicle to dictate legislative policies to localities (such as city governments and school
districts) and to avoid altering the boundaries of constitutional protections to meet an ever-
changing public sentiment. See, e.g., Isiah B. v. State, 500 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Wis. 1993)
(citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
121 G. W., 767 So. 2d at 193.
122 Id.
123 993 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
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marijuana on F.S.E., and when she asked the student about it, F.S.E. told the
assistant principal that there was a "roach" in the ashtray of his car, which was
parked on school grounds."" He told the assistant principal that he was late for
school because he had a flat tire on the way there and some "gentleman" came
along, helped him fix the tire, got in the car and smoked the marijuana. 5 The
assistant principal tried unsuccessfully to reach F.S.E.'s parents, and then called a
police officer to come to the school and assist her.'26 Once the officer arrived, the
three went to F.S.E.'s car, where the assistant principal directed F.S.E. to open the
car and get the roach out of the ashtray.'27 F.S.E. complied and handed the roach
to the officer; the assistant principal then said that she would like to verify the flat
tire in the trunk.' F.S.E. opened the trunk and, while doing so, moved a blanket
inside the trunk, which caused a second officer who had just arrived on the scene
to become concerned.'29 The second officer moved the blanket and discovered a
plastic bag containing a sizable amount of marijuana. 3 °
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that F.S.E.'s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by this search. '' It relied on TL.O. in finding
that "[a] school official may search a student or the student's property while either
are on school premises without a warrant when there is a reasonable suspicion to
believe that school policy or the law has been or is being violated."'32 In applying
T.L.O. the court reasoned as follows:
In the present case the Assistant Principal based the search upon a
reasonable suspicion. She smelled marijuana. Further, Appellant's own
admission to the existence and purported source of the smell satisfies any
reasonable suspicion standard. Second, the scope of the search in this case
is reasonably related to the circumstances. Appellant advised the Assistant
Principal that marijuana was in his car parked on school grounds and after
that was retrieved from the car by Appellant, the Assistant Principal asked
to see the flat tire to verify Appellant's reason for having the marijuana
cigarette in his car. This was not unreasonable.'
124 Id. at 772.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 id.
128 F.S.E., 993 P.2d 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
'3 Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325 (1985)) (emphasis added).
133 F.S.E., 993 P.2d at 772.
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Thus, by upholding the search itself, this court appears to have classified the
searched car as part of "the student's property" for Fourth Amendment purposes
and implicitly recognized that students have some expectation of privacy in their car
when parked on school premises - even if that privacy interest is overcome by a
showing of reasonable suspicion.
The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in People ex rel.
P.E.A. 34 P.E.A. involved the search of a student's car that was suspected of having
driven two other students, who intended to sell marijuana at the school, to school
that day.'35 The purpose of the search was to locate the drugs that the other two
students had intended to distribute, as searches of their persons revealed nothing.136
In finding the car search reasonable under T.L. 0.,' the Colorado court made some
important legal findings. First, the court concluded that students "have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, because they carry noncontraband as well as highly personal
items with them on school grounds."'3 That expectation, according to this court,
is then balanced in the T.L.O. analysis against the state's interests in maintaining
discipline and a sound learning environment in arriving at the two-part
reasonableness standard.'39 School officials met that standard in P.E.A. due to the
close connection between the defendant and the other two students, the limited ways
the students could have transported marijuana into the school, and the gravity of the
threat of having marijuana sold and distributed at the school. 4
2. Standard of Proof for a Warrantless Search
In all of the above cases, state courts have found that students possess some
privacy interest in their cars when parked on school grounds. This conclusion
usually is made implicitly by considering the reasonableness of the search of a
student's car. After all, if students may not expect any privacy in their cars, then
a car search need not satisfy any reasonableness requirement. Many courts have
struggled, though, to determine what level of protection students are afforded in
their cars under the Fourth Amendment.
A significant number ofcourts have concluded that the same level of reasonable
suspicion as required by T.L. 0. is required to search a student's car. The G. W. court
'3 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988).
3 Id. at 384.
136 Id.
7 Id. at 389-90.
138 Id. at 387.
3 P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 387-88.
'4 Id. at 389.
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seemed to adopt this philosophy in ruling that the search of G.W.'s truck "was
justified and was reasonably related to the student's assertion that G.W. had been
in the parking lot drinking."' 4 ' Likewise, the F.S.E. court examined both the student
and his property, including his car, within the reasonableness inquiry. 42 Finally,
the Colorado Supreme Court in P.E.A. determined that the "connection between
P.E.A. and F.M. establishes the articulable facts and concomitant rational inferences
necessary to create a reasonable suspicion that P.E.A. possessed drugs or other
contraband [in his car]."'43
However, the reasonable suspicion standard may not be as sweeping as some
courts might think. In Coronado v. State," Kim Benning, an assistant principal,
found out that Coronado had attempted to sell drugs to another student.' 4' Benning
questioned Coronado, patted him down, and searched him, finding no contraband
but discovering three hundred dollars in Coronado's billfold." When Benning
asked if he sold drugs, Coronado replied, "[n]ot on campus.' 147 A week later, the
school secretary informed Benning that Coronado was leaving school to attend his
grandfather's funeral. 48 Benning contacted both a sheriff's officer assigned to the
school and the school's security guard, telling them that Coronado was attempting
to leave and that Benning "'suspected his motives for leaving campus.," 49 Benning
saw Coronado and asked him where his car was parked; he replied that he did not
drive. 5 ' Benning contacted Coronado's relatives, who told her that his grandfather
had not died and that Coronado drove a Buick to school that morning. ' Coronado
continually was evasive in his answers to Benning and the officers present,
including questions as to which car was his and where it was located.' 2 When
testifying, Benning conceded that he did not observe Coronado commit any illegal
act and was only trying to determine whether he was "skipping school."'5 Benning
then patted down Coronado, finding nothing illegal, and searched him, which
included having Coronado remove his shoes and socks, empty his pockets, and pull
' Covington County v. G.W., 767 So. 2d 187, 194 (Miss. 2000).
142 F.S.E. v. State, 993 P.2d 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
141 P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
'4 835 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
14' Id. at 637.
14 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
141 Coronado, 835 S.W.2d at 637.
150 Id.
151 id.
152 Id. at 637-38.
151 Id. at 63 8.
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down his pants. 14 When this proved fruitless, the assistant principal and one of the
officers searched Coronado's locker, which yielded nothing.' They then took
Coronado to his car, where they demanded that he open it.'56 When he complied
with that demand, one of the officers searched the car and discovered bags of white
powder, a triple beam balance, and what appeared to be marijuana.' Neither
Benning nor the officers ever told appellant of the right to refuse a search of his
locker or vehicle.'58
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, sitting en banc, determined that the
search of Coronado's locker and car failed the second prong of the T.L.O.
analysis.'95 The court concluded that the search was "reasonable at its inception"
because Benning had reasonable grounds to suspect that Coronado might be
"skipping" school. 60 Thus, Benning was justified in questioning Coronado about
his reasons for leaving and in patting him down for safety reasons.' 6 ' However, the
subsequent searches of Coronado's clothing and person, his locker, and his car were
not "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which initially justified
Benning's interference" with him. 62 Nothing from the pat-down search indicated
that Coronado had any contraband with him or in his immediate control, so absent
any other statements or discoveries by Benning, nothing justified expanding the
search as it was done in this case.'63 Indeed, the court characterized these actions
as "unproductive, progressively intrusive searches culminating in the search of
appellant's vehicle" and "excessively intrusive in light of the infraction of
attempting to skip school."'" Thus, the main difference between Coronado and the
other car cases cited supra is that the infraction in question here had no connection
to the student's car at all. In evaluating the reasonableness of a car search, then, one
may infer that some reasonable connection between the car itself and the charge
initiating the search "at its inception" is the key inquiry.
Some states, however, have yet to delineate the standard of proof necessary to
sustain a search of a student's car on school grounds. Ohio's courts in In re
' Coronado, 835 S.W.2d at 638.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 638-39.
' Id. at 639.
158 Id.
's Coronado, 835 S.W.2d at 641.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 id.
163 id.
"6 Coronado, 835 S.W.2d at 641.
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DenggM encountered a case in which the Streetsboro City Schools granted
permission to Streetsboro's Police Department to search its high school's lockers
for contraband by using drug-sniffing dogs.16 When that search was completed, the
dogs and their handlers "were dispatched" to the school's parking lots. 67 During
the search of the lot, a dog "hit" on a vehicle owned by Dengg's father.168 An
officer opened and searched the vehicle and found a drug pipe containing marijuana
residue in the vehicle's console. 69 Dengg was charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia, and at a suppression hearing, a magistrate ruled that the warrantless
search of Dengg's vehicle was not reasonable and should be inadmissible. 7 ° The
trial court adopted the magistrate's determination, and the state appealed.171
In reversing the magistrate's ruling and declaring the search of Dengg's car
reasonable, the court in a 2-1 decision analyzed the situation curiously. It first
declared that the canine drug sniff did not constitute a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment or under Ohio precedent. 72 Then the court concluded
that the drug dog's indication of the presence of drugs created probable cause on its
own, despite the lack of individualized suspicion towards Dengg.7 , Finally, once
the police established "probable cause to believe that the evidence of a crime will
be discovered," they could conduct a warrantless search of the car under the so-
called "automobile exception" articulated in United States v. Ross,'7 as well as by
the Ohio Supreme Court.'7 In so holding, the court ducked two critical issues.
First, the court expressly refused to apply T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard to
justify warrantless police searches of cars on school property unless they fit a
specific warrant exception (thus the reference to the "automobile exception"). 7 6
Second, by ruling that the canine detection gave rise to probable cause, not
165 724 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
166 Id. at 1256.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 id.
170 Dengg, 724 N.E.2d at 1257.
171 id.
272 Id. at 1259. Compare Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding dog
sniff of student did not constitute a search), with B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d
1260, 1268 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that dog sniff of students was Fourth Amendment
search and was unreasonable under the circumstances), and Horton v. Goose Creek Indep.
Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Renfrow rationale and
recognizing drug dog's sniff of a person as a search).
"I Dengg, 724 N.E.2d at 1260.
174 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
17' Dengg, 724 N.E.2d at 1259-60 (citing State v. Mills, 582 N.E.2d 972,982-83 (1992)).
176 Id. at 1259.
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reasonable suspicion, the court avoided setting the standard for car searches on
school property when they are conducted by "school officials or their designees.""'
Despite the uncertainty that Dengg created, the vast majority of states have
implicitly granted students a reasonable expectation of privacy in cars parked on
school property, unless the court elects to apply G. W, supra. Therefore, in order
to search a student's car, one must obtain a reasonable suspicion that the car, not
just the student himself as in Coronado, may contain evidence of violation of a law
or school rule. However, the constitutional problems associated with school
searches done by people who are not school officials, but by law enforcement
personnel, may overshadow these concerns.
C. Use ofPolice "Resource Officers "orSecurity Personnel in Searching Students
on School Grounds
The above analysis of students' Fourth Amendment rights on school grounds
has presumed that the searches were carried out by school personnel. The analysis
becomes more complex, however, when law enforcement officers themselves
initiate or complete a search of a student when on school grounds. Indeed, the
T.L.O. Court specifically declined to discuss the proper standard for assessing a
school search's legality when carried out "in conjunction with or at the behest of
law enforcement agencies."' Furthermore, since T.L.O. was decided, more and
more police officers and quasi-law enforcement personnel are regularly stationed
on public school campuses.' This trend, when combined with the Supreme
177 Id.
'78' New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). Nevertheless, the Court in that
footnote hinted at what that standard could be by citing as follows: "Cf Picha v. Wielgos,
410 F.Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holdingprobable-cause standard applicable
to searches involving the police.)" Id. (emphasis added).
7 See, e.g., Aaron Baca, Police, District Create Planfor Safer Schools, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, Dec. 3, 1994, at BI (community-based policing plan would include stationing
officers "on the campus of each secondary school -- including the district's four junior high
and middle schools"); Angie Gaddy, School Safety Valve, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (SPOKANE,
WA), Aug. 21, 1999, at VI (plainclothes sheriff's detective placed full-time at Central
Valley High School as part of sheriffs "vision of seeing a uniformed officer at every
Spokane Valley high school"); Stacy D. Johnson, Students to See Changes, THE DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 7, 1992, at COMMUNITY III ("Security measures will be stepped up
this year as full-time campus officers patrol not only high schools but middle schools, too.");
Ledyard King, Schools, Deputies Disagree on Crimes, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE),
Apr. 4, 1996, at IA (53 sheriff's officers were stationed in Broward County schools in
1996); Rene Romo, Police Patrol School; Cruces Seeks Funding, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL,
Oct. 13, 1999, at B3 ("Four police officers were stationed Tuesday at Mayfield [High
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Court's inaction in settling what standard of review to apply when law enforcement
initiates or carries out a school search, has created a great deal of confusion for
public school administrators regarding what level of proof they (or the police) may
need when searching a student himself, his locker, his car, or anything else which
might contain a student's possessions. This problem has been exacerbated by the
fact that state courts have tried to fill this void that TL. 0. left open, but have done
so in a conflicting fashion.
1. The Chasm Among States - Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause?
When confronted with officer involvement in school searches, states take a
wide variety of approaches, some of which appear to be per se rules establishing
standards of probable cause or reasonable suspicion whenever law enforcement of
any variety enters the picture. Florida has recently taken such a stance in two state
appellate decisions rendered in the past five years.
First, in State v. D.S.,"' Karen Robinson, a middle school assistant principal,
received four reports that D.S., a student, was offering to sell drugs at the school.'
She contacted a second assistant principal, and the two officials escorted D.S. to
Robinson's office, where a Dade County Public School Police Officer was sitting
at Robinson's desk doing paperwork. 2 The officer continued his work as
Robinson stated to D.S. that she believed he had contraband on him and ordered
D.S. to empty his pockets onto the table.'83 After D.S. placed a plastic bag of
marijuana on the table, Robinson asked the officer to come forward and informed
him that D.S. had marijuana on him, which violated school rules." 4 The next day,
Florida filed a petition for delinquency against D.S. 5
D.S. moved to suppress the marijuana at trial, arguing that probable cause was
required to search him because a school police officer was present when the search
was conducted.'86 The trial court agreed, relying on Mi v. State,"7 which stated
that an officer must have probable cause for a search where he "directs, participates,
School] in response to an incident last week in which they said three masked students
carrying a bat, tire iron and metal rod entered an algebra class looking to attack another
student.").
180 685 So. 2d41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
'8' Id. at 42.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
"I D.S., 685 So. 2d at 42.
186 Id.
"' 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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or acquiesces in a search conducted by school officials."' 8 The District Court of
Appeals of Florida, Third District, reversed this ruling on three grounds. It first
concluded that the mere presence of the officer did not trigger the MJ. analysis
because he did not participate, direct, or acquiesce in the search.189 It then found
that MJ did not correctly state Florida law.' 90 Rather, the court held that "school
board police officers, who participate in searches initiated by school officials, or
who act on their own authority," need only satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standards set out in T.L.O.19 Finally, the court ruled that even if probable cause
was required, the record provided ample evidence that such a standard would have
been met. 92 The critical factor for the court in applying the reasonable suspicion
standard to the facts in D. S. appears to be that the officer was an employee of the
Dade County school board as authorized by Florida statute.'93 Thus, had an outside
police officer entered the school and affirmatively searched a student, Florida's
courts might submit that search to a probable cause analysis. However, Florida has
not encountered such a case to date and, indeed, has reaffirmed the distinction the
D.S. court drew.'94
Other states, though, have favored the probable cause approach. In State v.
Tywayne H.,' two uniformed police officers provided security at an after-prom
dance held in the local high school's gymnasium."' Two other officers arrived
shortly after the dance began, and all four were present at about 12:45 a.m., when
two students entered the gym through a side door.' 97 The four officers surrounded
the two students, one of whom smelled of alcohol, the other admittedly having
consumed one beer outside. 9 The officers asked the students to step outside,
frisked them, and uncovered a semi-automatic handgun. 99 The trial court denied
the students' motion to suppress the gun, and Tywayne H. appealed.200
18' Id. at 998.
189 D.S., 685 So. 2d at 42.
190 Id. at 43.
191 Id.
192 Id.
' Id. at 42 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.23165). Interestingly, this statute has since
been repealed by 1992 FLA. LAWS ch. 92-136, § 68.
194 See State v. Whorley, 720 So. 2d 282,283 (Fla. 1998) ("The cases uniformlyhold that
... school board employees need only reasonable suspicion to justify the search.")
(emphasis added).
'9' 933 P.2d 251 (1997), cert. denied, State v. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. 83 (1997).
196 Tywayne H., 933 P.2d at 253.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 id.
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling.2 ° '
Specifically, it found support in both T.L.O. and Acton that the rationale for
lowering the standard for searches done by school officials does not necessarily
apply to searches on school grounds conducted by police officers.02 The court
found significant support in Justice Powell's concurrence in T.L.O.:
The special relationship between teacher and student ... distinguishes the
setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers
function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the
responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons
to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between
school authorities and pupils. Instead there is a commonality of interests
between teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one
of personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his
education.2 °3
In this case, the court found that the search was conducted "completely at the
discretion of the police officers," the only contact with a school official being one
officer's question to a coach concerning whether students were allowed to enter the
gym through the side door.204 Thus, without any intervention or direction provided
by school officials, the court applied the probable cause standard to this search and
excluded the evidence it obtained.
Other state courts have indicated that at some future date they may adopt such
a bright-line standard. The Colorado Supreme Court in P.E.A. noted that, if the
questioning that led to the search of the student's car "had been by law enforcement
officials," then it would have evaluated the search under a probable cause
analysis.20 5 Similarly, the Dengg court refused to apply a reasonableness standard
for warrantless police searches on school grounds "until relevant precedent or
legislative enactments direct us to hold otherwise."20 6
Other states are beginning to retract their earlier bright-line positions. New
Mexico's Court of Appeals, for example, seems to have hedged on the probable
201 Tywayne H., 933 P.2d at 258.
202 Id. at 255.
201 Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring)).
204 Tywayne H., 933 P.2d at 254.
20, People ex rel. P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo. 1988).
206 In re Dengg, 724 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
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cause standard." 7 In doing so, that court made the following observations:
Any other conclusion, such as requiring probable cause of school resource
officers when school officials only need reasonable grounds to search,
might serve to encourage teachers and school officials, who generally are
untrained in proper pat down procedures or in neutralizing dangerous
weapons, to conduct a search of a student suspected of carrying a
dangerous weapon on school grounds without the assistance of a school
liaison officer... [It could be hazardous to discourage school officials
from requesting the assistance of available trained police resources....
The proper standard.. . should not promote unreasonable risk-taking."'
The New Mexico appellate court also noted that school resource officers in
most schools serve multiple purposes, including both preventing crime and assisting
school administration in maintaining order and an environment conducive to
learning. 09 Thus, aper se rule governing officers in all scenarios, including those
where they are not necessarily acting in a law enforcement capacity, would seem
to penalize both the school and law enforcement for trying to fill multiple roles
within the school. Not only does this more fact-specific approach make it more
difficult to provide guidance to individual school districts, it also raises two unclear
sub-issues: (1) what type of police officers may adopt the role of "school official;"
and (2) what level of outside police involvement raises the level of scrutiny to
probable cause.
2. Who Counts as Part of a "Law Enforcement Agency" or "School Official?"
Approaches to answering this question vary significantly. For example, Farias
v. State"' involved two separate investigations by a school district police officer
and a truancy officer that converged in an inventory search of Farias's car on school
grounds.2t" ' In upholding the search under a reasonable suspicion analysis, the
Texas appellate court did not differentiate between the two officers in applying
T.L.O. and Coronado to the facts of this case.212 One might assume from this
approach, then, that this court did not look as much to the nature of the officers'
207 In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431 (1999), cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149 (1999).
208 Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
I09 d. at 437 (citing In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis. 1997)).
210 1995 WL 737473 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.) 1995).
211 Id. at *1.
212 Id. at *3-*4.
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involvement, but rather, to the sheer location of the investigation - the school -
in mechanically applying T.L.O. Likewise, in State v. Felicelli,"3 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals characterized the "police liaison officer," who supervised an
assistant principal's search of a student, as a "school official" on par with the
assistant principal." 4 Many courts, however, struggle in differentiating between
police officers who regularly patrol schools and those who act as "resource" officers
in schools, providing support to school administration.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Williams confronted
one potential statutory solution to this judicial quandary.2"5 Robert Fazden, Chief
of the School Police for the City of Pittsburgh School District, was called to the area
of a local high school to investigate possible truant activity.2 6 On a city street
adjacent to school property, he "found two truant students and directed them to
proceed directly to school."2 7 While doing this, he had an encounter with a car
whose three occupants "stopped and looked at him, made a U-turn, gave him the
proverbial finger, and left the area."2 8 Fazden located the car parked on a city
street a block or two away from the incident, off school property.2" 9 He then
confronted its occupants, directed them to school, and notified school personnel,
requesting they hold the students until the matter could be resolved.2 Chief
Fazden then returned to the parked vehicle and looked into it.22 He "saw on the
back floor, in plain view, a sawed-off shotgun that was partially wrapped in
clothing, and a shotgun shell." 22 City police were called to investigate the scene,
but without waiting for them to arrive, other school police joined Chief Fazden in
opening the car." 3 Seeing the barrel of a revolver protruding from under the
driver's seat, they looked under that seat and found two more revolvers.224 The
school police turned the weapons over to city police,,who arrived about five minutes
later.225
23 600 N.W.2d 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
214 Id. ("[T]he information provided by the informant gave school officials reasonable
grounds for believing that a search of Felicelli's person would reveal that [he] possessed
marijuana[J") (emphasis added).
21S 749 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
216 Id. at 958.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Williams, 749 A.2d at 958.
221 Id. at 959.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 id.
225 Williams, 749 A.2d at 959.
20021
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Chief Fazden and his officers were School Police Officers as defined by
Pennsylvania statute. 226 As such, their duties were specifically delineated, and
according to this court, so were the places at which a School Police Officer could
act.227 In particular, one portion of the statute empowers the officers "[t]o enforce
good order in school buildings, on school buses and on school grounds in their
respective school districts.""2 8 The court read the language of this statute as
circumscribing the authority of School Police Officers in a manner akin to
university campus police and housing authority police. 29 In doing so, it refrained
from extending the officers' jurisdiction to "engage in judicial legislation to
effectuate a policy of fostering gun-free school zones., 230 Because the court
determined that the officers exceeded their statutory authority in searching the car
off-campus, it never reached the question of whether the search was constitutionally
permissible. Thus, in lieu of significant guidance from the judicial branch, school
districts might consider tackling this problem by asking for legislative grants of
special police to public schools, rather than working out individual relationships
between each school and its local police force. Alternatively, this legislative grant
might simply authorize schools to contract with local police forces, or individual
officers, and spell out the particular activities in which these officers may
participate. These solutions have the potential of greatly reducing the uncertainty
surrounding which officers qualify as school officials. However, the trade-off for
such Fourth Amendment clarity would likely involve much higher public school
costs, an exchange which those who fund public schools may be unlikely to accept.
In addition, one significant benefit of school partnerships with local police forces
has been that the two entities seem to work well together in dealing with troubled
youth who may present discipline problems both in school and in the community.
This is particularly true in terms of information-sharing - for often public schools
may not be aware of a student's criminal record, nor may local police readily have
access to a first-time juvenile offender's grades or school disciplinary records.
Thus, schools may feel significant administrative, as well as fiscal, costs if forced
to adopt Pennsylvania's approach due to judicial inaction in this area.
Public schools may not only balk at further straining already tight budgets, but
many may also simply not recognize the magnitude of the Fourth Amendment
questions that school resource officers can create. As a result, courts will then be
left with the difficulty of delineating when an officer peases acting on behalf of the
226 24 P.S. § 7-778.
227 Williams, 749 A.2d at 960-61 (citing 24 P.S. § 7-778(c)(1)).
.2 Williams, 749 A.2d at 960.
229 Id. at 961.
23I Id. at 962.
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school and begins acting as part of law enforcement. Courts to date have developed
widely divergent responses as to what factor(s) weighs most heavily in such
analysis; in some jurisdictions, the locus of the search remains paramount, while
other courts look to the officer's statutory grant ofjurisdiction, and still other states
believe the nature of the offenses being investigated tip the scales. Such a vast
array of decisions practically begs the Supreme Court to step in and define precisely
how to interpret its TL. 0. directives, as it recently has done in other areas of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
One state may have discovered a workable solution to this quandary.
Washington's state courts recently affirmed in State v. B.A.S 2 3' their approach of
outlining relevant factors in a school search situation. Auburn Riverside High
School's attendance officer observed B.A.S. and three other young boys outside the
school and concluded they had been off campus, which violated the school's closed
campus policy.232 After checking the attendance records and confirming that B.A.S.
was missing class, the officer escorted the four to his office and, invoking the
school's search policy, asked B.A.S. to empty his pockets. The purpose of this
search was to ensure that the students had not brought any prohibited items onto
campus.233 The search revealed a black case containing several baggies filled with
marijuana.234 B.A.S. was then charged in juvenile court with possession of
marijuana and unsuccessfully challenged the search on Fourth Amendment
grounds.2"
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, unanimously reversed the
juvenile conviction, finding that the attendance officer's suspicion of a closed
campus policy violation did not create reasonable suspicion that a subsequent
search would reveal evidence of B.A.S. having violated that policy, or any other law
or school rule.236 In so holding, the court made the following observations:
Washington courts have established the following factors as relevant in
determining whether school officials had reasonable grounds for a search:
the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness
of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the exigency
to make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of
13 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2000).
232 Id. at 245.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 B.A.S., 13 P.3d at 246.
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the information used as a justification for the search.237
The court concluded that the search of B.A.S. met none of these factors.
Specifically, it reasoned that "[t]here must be a nexus between the item sought and
the infraction under investigation," rejecting the state's "blanket supposition that
'[b]y violating school rules, a student necessarily draws individualized suspicion on
himself " sufficient to justify an automatic search for contraband.23 The B.A.S.
court also concluded that the underlying purpose of the school's search policy,
which was to "ensure the safety of students at school and to ensure that prohibited
items are not brought onto the school grounds," was not enough standing alone to
provide a reasonable basis for searching a student suspected of going off campus.239
Washington's approach to officer searches of students, as well as to school
searches generally, seems to answer many of the safety concerns raised by other
state courts that limit the privacy interests of students. For example, because one
factor in Washington's balance involves the prevalence and seriousness of the
problem at which the search is directed, presumably the state's case would have
been stronger if Auburn Riverside had recently encountered serious problems with
drugs or weapons.240 Similarly, had B.A.S.'s history or school record indicated
repeated problems with bringing contraband on campus, then the officer might have
had reasonable suspicion to search him; the B.A.S. court completely shut down the
state's attempt to establishper se reasonable suspicion by virtue of a rule violation
of any type.2 4' But perhaps the most compelling part of Washington's school search
analysis is that it predates T.L. 242 This fact illustrates how easy it would be for
the Supreme Court to adopt similar points of analysis from which lower courts
could more clearly derive a framework for evaluating reasonable suspicion from
case to case.
3. How Much Participation Triggers Probable Cause?
Unfortunately, for many state courts, the line to draw with officer searches
seems to be one of degree rather than of type, further diluting what little direction
237 Id.
2138 Id. at 246-47.
239 Id. at 247.
240 Id.
241 B.A.S., 13 P.3d at 247.
242 Id. at 246 n.8 ("Although our Supreme Court fust enunciated these factors in a pre-
T.L.O. case, State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781 (1977), the express
holding in that case was that a school official need only have 'reasonable grounds' to search
a student, and the McKinnon factors are therefore consonant with the holding in T.L.O.").
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has been given to school districts in this area of the law. Specifically, the focus to
date has zeroed in on the level of participation or role taken by the law enforcement
agent.
Courts that have surveyed the range of discussions and analyses by other
jurisdictions have generally lumped these decisions into three categories. First,
when a school official initiates a search or the police involvement is minimal, the
T.L. 0. two-prong reasonableness standard has been applied.243 Second, the same
standard has been applied when a school police or liaison officer acts on his or her
own authority.2" Finally, some courts have held that probable cause attaches where
"outside" police officers initiate a student search as part of their own investigation,
or in cases where school officials, in the language of T.L. 0., act "at the behest of"
these "outside" officers.245
If a consensus exists in this area, it might be that the probable cause/reasonable
suspicion question turns on who gets the proverbial ball rolling. For example,
probable cause seems to enter the analysis only when outside officers initiate an
investigation or search. Presumably, many courts that hold school police to a
reasonable suspicion standard would hold outside police to a similar standard if they
simply happened to be in the area at the time of the incident and were requested by
school administrators to assist. The Oklahoma court in F.S.E. hinted at this
distinction when it declared that a school official "may utilize law enforcement to
assist with an investigation or search of a student while on school premises so long
as the... official has a reasonable suspicion... and is acting in conjunction with
the police and not at the behest ofthe police ... ."" Similarly, the Supreme Court
243 See, e.g., In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431,436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); In re Angelia D.B.,
564 N.W.2d 682, 687 (Wis. 1997) (citing Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 191-92 (8th Cir.
1987) (applying the reasonable grounds standard where a school official acted in
conjmetion with a liaison officer in response to a report of stolen items); People v.
Alexander B. (In re Alexander B.), 220 Cal. App. 3d 1572,270 Cal. Rptr. 342,343-44 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (applying reasonable grounds standard where school official initiated an
investigation and requested police to detain a group of students and search for a weapon);
J.A.R. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (applying reasonable
grounds standard where a liaison officer conducted a search of a student after a school
official had initiated the investigation)).
244 See, e.g., Josue T., 989 P.2d at 437-38; Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 687 (citing
People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317, cert. denied, Dillworth v. Illinois, 517 U.S. 1197
(1996); In re S.F., 607 A.2d 793, 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (applying reasonable grounds
standard to search conducted by plainclothes police officer for the school district)).
24 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Tywayne H., 933
P.2d 251 (1997); F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
246 In re F.S.E., 993 P.2d 771, 773 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Cason v. Cook, 810
F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added).
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of Wisconsin has recently noted that, although a police investigation encompassing
the search of a student usually lacks Justice Powell's "commonality of interests"
between teacher and student, an investigation initiated by school officials in
conjunction with police differs because "the school has brought the police into the
school-student relationship., 247
However, some courts, particularly when analyzing car searches, have focused
much of their analysis on where the search takes place. Indeed, the G. W. court
emphasized the notice provided to students that their cars could be searched at any
time. 48 The F.S.E. court also brought the search in question under the reasonable
suspicion rubric by characterizing the car as part of the student's "property" that
was subject to search. 249 As such, the future remains unclear as to how a court
might resolve a scenario where the issue of who initiates the investigation or search
and the location of the search itself squarely clash. For instance, could outside
police search a student's car on school grounds if the school handbook provides, as
in G. W., that cars will be routinely checked or searched? The dicta from many of
the courts limiting students' privacy interests has hinted at widespread fear of crime
in public schools, so that indication might weigh in favor of the search."' However,
some states have elected to demand probable cause when outside patrol engages in
any search on school grounds. These lines of gradation do little to help the majority
of school districts, though, whose policies and arrangements with law enforcement
agencies range between the polar extremes. Unfortunately, these extremes seem to
be the only places where any Fourth Amendment clarity exists.
1m1. CONCLUSION
As illustrated supra, the lack of constitutional clarity in these areas is precisely
why the Supreme Court needs to intervene and clear up the constitutional standards
in these increasingly complex fact situations. State courts are striving to answer
these concerns, but they can only provide limited guidance. Some legislative and
executive solutions may present themselves in certain cases, but the Supreme Court
possesses the best vantage point from which to help school districts by providing
the necessary guidance in formulating adequate guidelines for school searches. Not
only would a uniform explication of T.L. 0. potentially reduce the number of state
judicial challenges to questionable school searches, but a clearer standard would
247 Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 688 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
248 Covington County v. G.W., 767 So. 2d 187, 193 (Miss. 2000).
249 F.S.E., 993 P.2d at 772.
250 See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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also allow school districts from different states to accurately collaborate regarding
school search policies and ultimately arrive at policies that serve the goals of the
school and protect student rights. Sixteen years have passed since the Court
decided T.L.O., and many significant constitutional questions remain open. Now
is the time for the Court to grant certiorari and resolve some of these pressing
questions before the thicket of state and federal decisions becomes too unworkable
to sort out.
Should the Court endeavor to clarify what T.L.O. 's "reasonableness under all
the circumstances" test actually means, it needs to begin by outlining which factors
are most important in the two-part balance. The three commonplace fact scenarios
this note outlines all encounter the same fundamental problem: different courts
emphasize wildly different factors. Some courts place heavy weight on the locus
of the search; others focus on who completes the search; still other courts examine
who initiates the investigation leading up to the search; and a significant number of
state courts (and state legislatures) rely heavily on the provision of notice to
students that searches may occur at any time. Surely this wide spectrum of analysis
is not the kind ofjurisprudential result the T.L. 0. court envisioned when it decided
that case. As the title of this note suggests, the existence of such dissonant state
decisions has led to mass confusion for schools themselves, which feel pressure to
both adopt overzealous search policies to ward off threats of violence and hesitate
in applying these policies for fear of legal action. At least one state's judicial
system (Washington) has substantially answered many of these concerns by
iterating what factors are relevant in a school search.2"' The Court has a unique
opportunity to clarify and revisit its analysis from sixteen years ago in the same
manner, and should do so quickly. The welfare of school districts, as well as of
schoolchildren themselves, may hang in the balance.
Jason E. Yearout
251 State v. B.A.S., 13 P.3d 244, 246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. McKinnon,
558 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1977); State v. Slattery, 787 P.2d 932 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); State
v. Brooks, 718 P.2d 837 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)).
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